Collective action taking place on Internet platforms leaves a digital imprint which may be harvested to better understand the dynamics of mobilization. This 'big data' offers social science researchers the potential for new forms of analysis, using real-time transactional data based on entire populations, rather than sample-based surveys of what people think they did or might do. This paper uses a big data approach to track the growth of about 20,000 petitions to the UK Government over two years, analyzing the rate of growth and the outreach mechanism. The number of signatures was collected for all petitions with an hourly resolution. The vast majority of petitions did not achieve any measure of success; over 99 percent failed to get the 10,000 signatures required for an official response, and only 0.1 percent attained the 100,000 required for a parliamentary debate. We analyze the data through a multiplicative process model framework to explain the growth of signatures at the population level. We have defined and measured an average outreach factor for petitions and show that it decays very fast (reducing to 0.1% after 10 hours); after 24 hours, a petition's fate is virtually set.
INTRODUCTION
Increasingly collective action takes place in whole or at least in part online, leaving transactional data that allows for new forms of analysis. In this paper, we analyze petitions submitted to the UK Government on the central government portal. This electronic petition platform was developed by the UK Cabinet Office for the Coalition Government in 2010 and launched in August 2011 at http: //epetitions.direct.gov.uk.
The petition platform replaced a previous government platform on the No. 10 Downing Street website, which was the first online petitions platform in the UK. The previous platform ran from November 2006 until March 2011, during which time the site received more than 12 million signatures from over 5 million unique email addresses [10] . Both the No. 10 site and the newer cabinet office site have allowed anyone to view petitions, and any user with a valid email address to create a new petition or to sign an existing petition. There are important differences between the sites, however. Whereas the first site showed the names of the 500 most recent signatories to a petition, the new site shows only the name of the petition creator (see Figure 1) . The sites also have provided alternative measures for the 'success' of a petition. For the earlier, No. 10 site, the government promised an official response to all petitions receiving at least 500 signatures, while the coalition government promised in 2010 that any petition on the new site attracting more than 100,000 signatures would qualify for a parliamentary debate on the issue raised.
In this paper we focus on the second petition website. Hale, Margetts, and Yasseri [3] analyzed the first website and identified that the number of signatures a petition received on its first day was pivotal to its ultimate success. The low threshold for success (500 signatures) and the coarse daily resolution of data on growth for the earlier, No. 10 site did not allow for an in-depth examination of the critical early moments of petitions. In this paper, we undertake a new in-depth investigation of the early growth of petitions aided by the higher threshold for success on the new platform (100,000 vs 500 signatures) and a finer-grained capture of petition growth (hourly vs. daily resolution). Analysis of this second platform also allows us to compare its dynamics with those of the earlier platform, which we do throughout our analysis where possible.
BACKGROUND
Signing petitions has long been among the more popular political activities, leading the field for participatory acts outside voting. In addition to the potential to bring about policy change, petition signing has had other social benefits ascribed to it such as reinforcing civic mindedness [9] . Online petitioning is one of a growing portfolio of Internetbased democratic innovations [8] . The widespread use of electronic petition platforms by both governments and NGOs (e.g., Avaaz and 38 Degrees) has received accolades for their democratic contribution [2, 1] , and the German e-petition platforms have been analyzed previously [5, 4] . Nonetheless, the UK petition platforms have received rather less attention in recent political science research, with the exception of qualitative work by Wright [10] .
Online petitions are interesting examples of mobilizations with strong online imprints, which will include the entire transaction history for both successful and unsuccessful mobilizations. The data that can be harvested from the signing of electronic petitions is an example of what is now commonly known as 'big data,' representing a transactional audit trail of what people actually did (as opposed to what people think they did) and an entire population (without the need to take a representative sample). Data like this represents a big shift for social science research into political behavior, which has traditionally rested on survey data, or, for elections, voting data. Big data also presents challenges to social science research-it often does not come with handy demographics attached, and we do not know where people came from to any one interaction, nor where they are going. Therefore, it is often difficult to match up online activities across different platforms or to identify influences of age, income, or gender on behavior. Nevertheless, this data makes it possible to look at the different patterns of growth in the 20,000 mobilization curves that we have and identify the distinctive characteristic of those mobilizations that succeed and those that fail with our digital hindsight based on their early growth rate and without any content analysis. Such studies, using data that has rarely been available to political science researchers before the current decade, may tell us something about the nature of collective action itself in a digital world. Of the research noted above, Jungherr and Jurgens used a smaller dataset to illustrate the viability of a big data (or computational social science) approach [4] , but other studies used surveys [5] or more qualitative approaches [10] .
RESULTS

Data collection
The UK Government's petition website was accessed hourly from 5 August 2011 to 22 February 2013 with an automated script. At each hour, the number of total signatures to date for each active petition was recorded. In addition, the title of the petition, the name of the petitioner, the text of the petition, the launch date of the petition, and the government department at which the petition was directed were recorded whenever a new petition appeared. Overall, 19,789 unique petitions were tracked, representing all active petitions available publically at any point during the study.
Overall statistics
A total of 7,303,019 signatures were collected for the 19,789 petitions. However the distribution of the number of signatures per petition is highly skewed. Figure 2 shows this skew by plotting the total number of signatures for each petition plotted against the rank order of the petition by total number of signatures. It is clear that a small number of petitions have been signed many times each, while a large number of petitions have only been signed a few times each.
Only 5 per cent of petitions obtained 500 signatures in total, which is comparable to the percentage achieving 500 signatures on the previous, No. 10 petition site [3] . Beyond this, only 4 percent of the petitions received 1,000 signatures. Only 0.7 percent attained the 10,000 signatures seemingly required for receiving some sort of official response, and only 0.1 percent attained the 100,000 signatures required for a parliamentary debate.
Despite the much larger threshold for success compared to the previous No. 10 platform (100,000 vs 500 signatures), a similar pattern in growth emerges suggesting that the first day was crucial to achieving any kind of success [3] . Any petition receiving 100,000 signatures after three months, needed to have obtained 3,000 signatures within the first 10 hours on average. The external measure of 100,000 signatures as 'success' is also clear in Figure 2 : petitions rarely grow further once passing the 100,000 signature mark. Figure 3 shows the number of signatures over time (hours passed from each petition's launch time). The lines are shaded according to the final number of signatures each petition collected. From this figure it can be easily observed that even those petitions with large number of signatures have collected them in a very short period after the launch and generally after a few days the growth slows significantly for all petitions (note the logaritmic scale of y-axis).
Outreach and growth
We next attempt to capture the characteristic of early rapid growth and decay that the data reveals, with a model of 'collective attention' decay, drawing on Wu and Huberman [11] . In their model, they calculate a 'novelty' parameter relating to the novelty of news items on a news sharing platform that decays over time. In a more general framework, the decay in attention could have other reasons, for example reaching the system size limits, or lack of viral spread. In the model, N agents at the time t, bring N µ new agents in the next step on average, µ being a multiplication factor. In our case, this would mean that every signature on petition i brings µi new signatures in the next hour, leading to an exponential growth of rate µi in the number of signatures. This model fits the data we empirically observe quite well for the short period of time directly after a petition's launch. Very soon, however, the spread rate decays and new signatures come at a much lower rate.
As in the model of Wu and Huberman [11] , we introduce a decay factor to capture this decrease. Specifically, we let the multiplication factor decay by introducing a second factor r(t), which decays in a way that is an intrinsic of the medium: each signature at time t, on average brings µir(t) new signatures in the next hour. To correct for the early saturation observed in the empirical data, we enter an 'outreach' parameter which can change overtime and dampen the fast initial growth. The growth equation then reads:
Number of signatures at time t then can be written as:
In the limit of small time increments, Equation 2 converts to:
We can assume that the number of signatures at the beginning is one, and therefore averaging of the logarithm of both sides of Equation 3 leads to:
where E[.] indicates the average over the whole sample. In this framework, each petition has its own fitness and therefore an individual growth rate of µi, whereas r characterizes the overall outreach power of the platform as a whole. The outreach of the platform is assumed to be independent of the petition fitness and popularity. This disentanglement between this two factors enables us to calculate the outreach factor of the system by considering the whole sample of petitions and averaging over the logarithm of the number of signatures in hourly bins, starting from the time a petition is launched and then calculated in hourly increment at time t and normalized by the logarithm of the number of signatures up to time t as follows:
We have calculated the outreach factor as a function of time according to Equation 5 and illustrated it in Figure 4 . The outreach factor decays very fast and after a time span of 10 hours reduces to 0.1%. This model holds only when the growth rates of different petitions come from a localized distribution with finite average and variance. To check this condition, we calculate the ratio between the sample average and variance of log(N (t)) for different t and check the following linear relation holds:
where µ and σ are the sample average and the standard deviation of the individual growth rates. If the multiplicative model and the framework are valid, the ratio between the sample mean and the variance of log(N ) should remain constant over time. Figure 5 plots these two values and demonstrates the ratio does indeed remain constant (diagonal line).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes petitioning patterns on the UK government portal site for 18 months from August 2011 to February 2013. We find that most petitions started on the platform fail to achieve any real traction, while the minority of petitions that do amass a large number signatures do so quickly. The distribution of the number of signatures per petition is highly skewed: a few petitions capture a large number of signatures, while most petitions receive very few signatures. Furthermore, the number of successful petitions in comparison to the total number of petitions is very small. By applying a simple multiplicative growth model, we have illustrated that the intrinsic time scale of the platform is very short and the growth of signatures on petitions exhibits rapid dynamics.
These findings have immediate application to petition platform designers as well as to petitioners themselves. Although the UK site defaults to having petitions be active for one year, our analysis indicates that most signatures are added shortly after a petition is launched. Shorter deadlines such as the three week deadline of German petitions [4] or the one month deadline of the US petition platform, therefore, might produce similar outcomes without the clutter of old petitions on the sites. This is a point we will examine though a comparison with the US petitions platform in future work. The analysis also highlights the importance for petitioners of gaining early traction. Experimental research shows that the willingness of individuals to sign a petition varies with the social information provided on how many other individuals have signed the petition [6, 7] . The early growth of petitions reflects a similar feedback loop as the petitions with the most signatures get further signatures. The outreach factor, however, decays very quickly indicating that the window of opportunity for success is very small on the platform.
The outreach factor is fit to all the data on the platform and reflects the collective decay in attention to the platform on the whole. In comparison to the work by Wu and Huberman [11] on the Digg news sharing website, where the outreach factor (there called novelty) decayed "faster than power law," with a half-life of approximately one hour, the petitions outreach factor decays very close to power law. Thus, attention to petitions lasts somewhat longer than attention to the news links analyzed by Wu and Huberman [11] . It will be useful in future research to compare the outreach of various platforms, political and non-political, to understand the variations in the dynamics of different platforms. 
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